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C
ongress predicated the Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA) on one principle and two 
key facts when it passed the act in 1977. The 
principle is core and remains true. The facts 
point to what can and should change to make the CRA 
more effective in what has become a different kind of 
marketplace.
The principle is that banks had an affirmative respon-
sibility to serve everyone in their markets equally well 
without regard to place, race, gender, or ethnicity. This 
principle serves the fundamental precept of our nation—
freedom of opportunity and justice for all—and fulfills 
the purposes of a robust financial services sector.
The first fact is that banks, at the time the CRA 
became law, had clearly delineated geographic mar-
kets—or footprints. The second fact is that the primary 
business of banks at that time was to provide a prudent 
savings option for a vast majority of Americans. Various 
estimates suggest that almost 70 percent of the long-
term savings of Americans were in banks in 1977, when 
Congress passed the CRA. The CRA defined “markets” as 
those places where banks took deposits.
In theory and in practice, the CRA has supported 
community development well. In fact, it has largely 
defined community development. For better or worse, 
it is significantly more difficult to lend and invest in 
markets that are not included in CRA footprints. In 
practice, underserved submarkets (most often minority 
and low-income but defined primarily by CRA-shaped 
geography) comprise the “community” and the provi-
sion of financial services is the means to its “develop-
ment.” The CRA has supported countless community 
development organizations, strategies, and initiatives. 
It has proved to be a remarkably effective law because 
it has connected opportunity markets to opportunity 
capital and financial services.
Since its passage, almost everything having to do with 
the CRA has changed. Competition, technology, product 
and service innovation, demographics, and consumer 
patterns and behavior have transformed banking. At a 
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minimum, two changes are key: the vast majority of 
banking is defined around complex consumer demo-
graphics rather than geography, and deposit-taking is 
now a relatively small, but still significant, line of busi-
ness from the perspective of a bank’s financial perfor-
mance and shareholder concerns. Banking no longer 
centers around place and savings.
Banking today centers around consumer demograph-
ics, delivery channels, and product innovations. The rise 
of online banking services is an indication of the trans-
formation, suggesting that technological tools rather than 
revolving doors are, or soon will be, the primary way 
that consumers enter banks.
The financial market crisis that started in 2007 will 
reverberate through banking, financial services, and 
community development for the next decade. The trans-
formation in form and structure of the financial services 
industry, the need to reinvent products ranging from 
securities to ratings, and the apparent redefinition of 
financial markets regulation will shape for a generation 
or more our nation’s commitment and capacity to make 
opportunity finance available to everyone.
The focus of the past few decades on emerging demo-
graphic markets, efficient ways of serving those markets, 
and new products that meet their needs will anchor 
financial services regardless of the framework. This focus 
will ensure a role for the CRA in whatever new form 
it might take. Bankers talk openly and often about the 
critical importance of Latino markets, for example, and 
follow up anxiously with concern about whether they 
are doing enough to capture market share.
As a result, the CRA no longer should be viewed as 
a policy for the fringe markets. The fringe markets of the 
1970s and 1980s are rapidly becoming the broadcloth of 
the U.S. and global economy and will continue for de-
cades to come. The CRA—in a new form, CRA 2.0—can 
be a bank’s portal to opportunity markets, the emerging 
growth markets of coming decades, Communities 2.0.
This transformation to CRA 2.0 requires at least four 
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1. Policymakers need to reaffirm the fundamental 
principle of the CRA as central to broad economic 
prosperity in the United States and other nations. This is, 
first, a matter of economic policy, and second, antipov-
erty or community development policy. The principle 
of the CRA is more important than ever. Banks, as well 
as all financial institutions that rely on taxpayer sup-
port, explicitly and implicitly, still have an affirmative 
responsibility to serve everyone in their markets equally 
well without regard to place, race, gender, ethnicity, and 
other discriminatory factors, some of which we have 
learned about only because of the CRA.
The CRA will be stronger when the transaction, or 
the exchange, is more transparent and accountable; that 
is, when everyone understands what all sides are giving 
and what they are getting. This requirement opens a set 
of questions that policymakers, economists, and political 
theorists will need to focus on.
• How do you quantify the value of multifaceted 
government support for financial institutions? What, 
for example, is the value of deposit insurance rela-
tive to the value of Treasury’s liquidity for JPMorgan 
Chase in its acquisition of Bear Stearns?
• What factors currently define the CRA as antipov-
erty and/or community development policy? What 
would characterize it instead as economic growth 
policy? Are there existing models that the CRA can 
use that would accentuate its economic role?
• What, in this scenario, would differentiate the CRA 
from more familiar economic growth strategies, 
such as investments in education or infrastructure? 
Is there a danger that the CRA would lose its ability 
to focus on low-income and low-wealth persons 
and places? What would prevent mission creep?
The $700 billion bailout program (TARP) that Con-
gress created raises the stakes—and raises new ques-
tions. The role of government capital in stabilizing and 
sustaining the financial services industry, much more 
than just banks, carries with it a clear and irrefutable 
obligation that participating institutions meet the implicit 
standard of the CRA—serving all markets equally well 
and without discrimination. However, the complexity of 
the intervention and the diversity of the institutions exac-
erbate the challenge of how to implement solutions. 
• Are the policy expectations of distressed institutions 
such as AIG different from those of a healthy one? If 
part of the cause of distress is irresponsible practic-
es, would mandating responsible practices (beyond 
basic safety and soundness) be a reasonable path to 
institutional health?
• With so much of the financial services sector ail-
ing or failing, would the imposition of CRA-type 
responsibilities help or hinder systemic recovery? 
Would the CRA take the blame if distressed institu-
tions fail? (After CRA opponents falsely blamed the 
CRA for the financial market mess in the first place, 
is there any cause to doubt that they would scape-
goat the CRA?)
• Is the disorder in the financial marketplace a 
unique opportunity to introduce a new systemic 
requirement that all players share responsibility for 
responsible financial services, opportunity finance, 
and community reinvestment? For policymakers, 
the question is: Will there ever be a better time?
Policy should also recognize that much, but not all, 
of CRA 2.0 activity will be either below-market rate (as 
determined by conventional risk-assessment models) 
or philanthropic. This touches on a set of questions that 
are already in play: Is the CRA already diluted by the in-
creasing focus on profitable CRA opportunities? Is there 
an optimal balance of below-market and market-rate 
CRA portfolios? What are the parameters for acceptable 
cross-subsidy strategies by CRA-covered financial institu-
tions, particularly when their financing often involves 
multiple subsidy streams (such as tax credits)?
 2. The CRA’s (or its successor law’s) definition of 
markets needs to reflect financial markets as they exist 
today rather than as they were in 1977. The CRA still 
should apply to geographic markets, but deposit-taking 
is an obsolete marker for markets. By current estimates, 
less than 20 percent of Americans’ long-term savings 
now are deposited in banks. A more appropriate and 
useful definition of financial institution markets, for 
the sake of the CRA and otherwise, is everywhere each 
financial institution offers and/or provides products and 
services and everyone it serves. If a bank offers a credit 
card to a low-income person, for example, its CRA 
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products and services) should, in principle, extend not 
only to that person but to the geographic market where 
that person lives.
Implementing this policy may not be as easy as it 
seems. Policymakers would need to find a reasonably 
simple but clear way of defining markets. The challenge 
is that consumer markets are often volatile and fast-
changing. The response may be that financial institu-
tions are well prepared to respond to these challenges. 
The financial services industry knows where to find cus-
tomers, regardless of their income or wealth, and how 
to market and sell to them. And, increasingly, it knows 
what products and services customers need. A small but 
significant portion of the industry, as the current credit 
crisis has proved, took advantage of that knowledge to 
prey on consumers.
The capacity of the financial services industry to 
identify markets demographically is extraordinary, and it 
can be used to create opportunities for low-income and 
low-wealth individuals. If the market research capacity 
of, say, Ameriquest or Countrywide were turned to good 
purpose, for example, financial institutions could com-
pete in “opportunity markets,” where nonconforming 
assets present potential for both incremental and disrup-
tive market gains.
Just as Web 2.0 reflects a current idea of commu-
nity, CRA 2.0 should do the same. Banks have choices 
about the markets they will serve, but the markets they 
choose to serve will define the community reinvestment 
markets for which they are responsible. As a practical 
matter, just as the CRA in its current form exempts the 
smallest banks, CRA 2.0 needs a reasonable minimum 
standard. Rather than using asset size, however, CRA 
2.0 should apply a materiality test. If a financial institu-
tion’s share of a market is material (that is, at least five 
percent of the market), it should be subject to what-
ever the appropriate expectations might be under CRA 
2.0. Credit card banks, for instance, target products 
to particular market demographics, as they should. If 
Capital One held a dominant market share for revolving 
credit-card products in Southeast Washington, DC, for 
example, it might carry a commensurate responsibility 
to provide revolving credit across the demographic and 
economic spectrum.
In short, financial institutions could choose their 
markets, and their markets in turn would define their 
CRA 2.0 service areas. This is primarily a problem for 
market research.
• Can policymakers define markets in ways that are 
consonant with the ways market players think and 
act? 
• Are there existing tools in the well-developed busi-
ness of market research that enable ready answers 
to materiality questions? To market share in con-
sumer markets that change? 
• Will this approach work if the test is applied on 
a periodic basis only—for example, only when a 
financial institution is acting on its CRA require-
ments or strategy? New Markets Tax Credits, for 
example, accept a one-time test at the moment an 
investment is made. Would such a test work here?
3. Under CRA 2.0, financial institutions should use 
diverse delivery channels to fulfill their responsibilities 
to their redefined communities. In 1977, banks had few 
viable delivery channels and relied primarily on suc-
cessful community development corporations (CDCs) 
and other nonprofits defined by local geographies. CDCs 
remain central in some markets, but over the past 30 
years sophisticated capital, product, and service delivery 
channels have emerged. How well do we understand 
these channels? What challenges might financial institu-
tions face as they become comfortable with entities that 
operate with different purposes? How can CRA-covered 
financial institutions learn to use the best-available chan-
nels rather than just the most familiar?
A significant number of well-known and well-
respected delivery channels exist that have the capacity 
to deliver billions of dollars—possibly tens of billions of 
dollars—of opportunity financing annually. After years 
of working with the CRA and other levers, many banks 
have preferred partners in their existing markets. Most 
nonbank financial institutions, however, have few, if any, 
partners to draw on.
These delivery channels incorporate local, regional, 
and national market-based financial collaborations 
involving banks, Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs), government, and diverse financial 
counseling agencies. In some cases, these systems are 
mature, sophisticated, and ahead of the curve. Some are 
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and scalable ones) are grounded in markets defined by 
economic activity but not by government policy. Today 
this delivery system is good but not great—but it is not 
far from providing a capacity commensurate with market 
demand and need.
To that end, CRA 2.0 should recognize and encour-
age financial institution engagements through both 
geographically and economically delimited market 
channels. Geographic market channels are familiar. 
Economic market channels (which might also be geo-
graphic) include a number of intermediary strategies.
• Investing in, lending to, and offering products 
through CDFIs, including but not limited to partici-
pating in syndicated or related asset sales.
• Participating in syndicated or related asset sales 
through other financial institutions with differing 
capacities within particular markets; for example, 
an East Coast bank or investment manager that of-
fers products or services (credit cards or investment 
accounts) in, say, Rapid City, South Dakota, might 
participate in CRA 2.0 activities through a Rapid 
City–based financial institution.
• Participating in municipal or state government 
financing channels that meet CRA 2.0 standards.
• Financing CRA 2.0 innovation, research and de-
velopment, and infrastructure in addition to, not 
instead of, intermediary financing.
 Lawmakers ought to focus primarily on how best to 
fit these delivery channels to financial institutions under 
the CRA.
What are the challenges of aligning the capaci- • 
ties of the delivery channels to the demands of 
CRA 2.0? To what extent is that investment simply 
building balance-sheet strength and capacity (in 
the manner of the CDFI Fund in the Department 
of the Treasury) versus supporting research and 
development? Is there sufficient support for innova-
tion to enable the delivery channel players to keep 
pace with demand for appropriate, safe, and sound 
delivery channels?
• How can key players on both sides (financial 
institutions and delivery channels) learn to work 
together without a shotgun policy?
Last, CRA 2.0 investors face a significant challenge 
in finding and using delivery channels. Opportunity 
Finance Network, my organization, has developed a 
ratings system for investors in CDFIs with the goal of 
reducing funding and transaction costs. Still in its early 
stages, the CDFI Assessment and Ratings System (CARS) 
provides investors with normative ratings of CDFI finan-
cial risk and performance and impact risk and perfor-
mance.1 Ratings reports are detailed quantitative and 
narrative assessments. The question remains whether 
CARS can or should be adapted to serve other delivery 
channels or whether other ratings systems might emerge 
to meet market demand. A ratings system infrastructure 
to give CRA 2.0 investors transparency and consistency 
seems both desirable and inevitable.
 4. Congress should create a new investment class 
to facilitate CRA 2.0 financing by stipulating either: 
(1) a new group of products (such as CRA 2.0 mutual 
funds) with explicit and appropriate fiduciary standards 
that include opportunity finance; or (2) that manag-
ers of existing products (such as pension funds) would 
not violate their fiduciary requirements by investing in 
CRA 2.0 opportunities (some at market rates and some 
below-market rates) that might carry a different level 
of risk than other assets they manage. In fact, Congress 
might make it clear that financial managers who are 
not investing in CRA 2.0 are not fulfilling their fiduciary 
responsibilities, since the principle of CRA 2.0 is that 
every person should have access to the resources for 
economic opportunities.
This idea circles back to the first one—that the CRA 
should be a core component of economic growth rather 
than just a policy for an outlier of economic policy. This 
may be the most important idea among the four, but it is 
also the most challenging.
• How long would it take to introduce a new funda-
mental principle into a well-established financial 
system—money and investment management? 
What resistance would policymakers face?
• What impact would we see from a new fiduciary 
requirement that allows or requires even a slight 
exception to standards of financial return or yield? 
What laws, policies, and practices would be 
involved?
1	 For	more	information,	see	http://opportunityfinance.net/financing/finance_sub4.aspx?id=56.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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Conclusion
Market innovations will always outpace statutory and 
regulatory solutions. The CRA as it is currently applied 
is obsolete because of its form, but not because of its 
purpose or intent. The policy fix is relatively simple, 
even though the implementation of the changes I 
suggest would take years to complete. A forward-looking 
version of the CRA would continue to serve low-income 
and low-wealth individuals and communities if the 
regulatory form were sufficiently dynamic.
CRA 2.0 can and should start from market 
opportunities and respond to market changes. Within 
the next two to four years, the U.S. government likely 
will rewrite the basic laws and regulations that govern 
financial market activities and behavior in response 
to the unraveling financial market conditions. This is 
a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make fair and just 
access to economic opportunities a foundation of the 
structure of U.S. economic financial markets. If we miss 
this opportunity, we will lessen the odds that economic 
and financial market recovery over coming years and 
decades will be full and robust and so put at risk the 
vitality of our long-term economic growth. 
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